In 1990, in response to the occurrence of Ebola virus (subsequently identified as subtype Reston) infection among cynomolgus monkeys imported from the Philippines, the United States implemented strict disease control measures for handling nonhuman primates during transit and quarantine and initiated importer facility compliance inspections. Disease control measures emphasized protection of workers from exposure, use of containment facilities and procedures, measures to prevent spread of infection among animals, and laboratory testing of animals that die or become ill during quarantine. From 1991 -1995, no outbreaks of filovirus infection occurred, and only one other disease outbreak (caused by Mycobacterium species) was recognized. In April 1996, Ebola virus (subtype Reston) infection was identified in another group of cynomolgus monkeys imported from the Philippines. The disease control measures implemented since the first Ebola virus (subtype Reston) outbreak appeared to work well. Currently, the 27 registered importer facilities import Ç8500 nonhuman primates annually, and mortality rates are õ1.0%. Importer facilities receive regular inspections, and compliance with disease control measures and disease reporting is excellent.
Since the 1940s, when crates of monkeys arriving from yelmeasures during transit and quarantine were variable. In 1989, low fever zones were required to have wire mesh screening to there were ú140 registered facilities importing up to 24,000 exclude mosquito vectors, the US Public Health Service has nonhuman primates per year (principally macaques). Mortality regulated the importation of nonhuman primates in order to rates during transit and quarantine were Ç20% (unpublished prevent the introduction and spread of diseases communicable informal telephone survey conducted by CDC, December 1989; to humans. The current US Foreign Quarantine Regulations Tipple MA). However, no outbreaks of zoonotic disease associregarding nonhuman primates (42 CFR part 71.53) [1] were ated with imported nonhuman primates in quarantine were reput in force in 1975 to address historic and emerging infectious ported to CDC during this period. disease concerns associated with imported nonhuman primates
In late 1989, filovirus infection was identified in a group of (notably, African monkeys infected with Marburg virus were critically ill and dying cynomolgus monkeys from the Philipimported into Europe in 1967, resulting in human infection, pines at a registered importer quarantine facility in Reston, person-to-person transmission, and deaths) [2] . The 1975 reguVirginia [3] . The virus was subsequently identified as a new lations prohibit the importation of nonhuman primates for use Ebola virus strain, subtype Reston (EBO-R). By early 1990, as pets and require that importers of such animals do the followfilovirus infection was identified in four shipments of cynomoling:
gus monkeys from the Philippines at three registered quarantine • Register with the Centers for Disease Control and Prefacilities. Nearly 500 animals died or were euthanatized to vention (CDC).
control the outbreak in Reston. A number of additional disease • Certify that imported nonhuman primates will be used control measures were implemented in response to that outonly for scientific, educational, and exhibition purposes.
break and the subsequent investigation [4] . Principal among • Isolate shipments of imported nonhuman primates for 31 these requirements is laboratory testing for acute filovirus infecdays upon arrival.
tion (item 8, below) during the mandatory 31-day quarantine • Maintain records regarding each shipment of nonhuman to rule out active disease. Following are the requirements and primates.
measures that remain in place today.
• Report suspected zoonotic illness in animals or workers.
• Permits are required to import cynomolgus, rhesus, and From 1975 -1989, registration was primarily an administraAfrican green monkeys [5] . tive function of the CDC's Division of Quarantine. Routine
• Disease control measures must be followed during transit quarantine facility inspections and monitoring of the handling and quarantine. of shipments in transit were not performed. Disease control
• Specialized equipment must be used to minimize exposure of humans to nonhuman primates during transit and quarantine.
• Worker protection measures must be followed to prevent
• Workers must be trained regarding the risks and protecAlice, Texas. They import, quarantine, and condition primates for introduction into breeding colonies at their facility and for tive measures for exposure to nonhuman primates, and supervision must be provided to ensure compliance with distribution to other facilities, all for scientific use. Their last inspection was in January 1995. They have been in substantial standard operating procedures.
• Importers must document arrangements for measures to compliance with CDC requirements since 1990. When the first animal in the 21 March 1996 shipment died, minimize human exposure to nonhuman primates during all phases of shipment and quarantine. the facility submitted specimens to an approved laboratory for filovirus testing, as required by their special permit. The posi-• Cynomolgus, rhesus, and African green monkeys that die during quarantine must be tested for filovirus antigen, tive results were reported immediately to CDC. Additional sampling, testing, and extension of the quarantine period were using antigen-capture ELISA [6] ; those exhibiting signs of illness suggestive of filovirus infection but recovering done in consultation with CDC, again as required by the permit. Although CDC inspectors did not monitor the handling of this during quarantine must be tested for IgG antibodies, using ELISA [7] . particular shipment upon arrival at the port of entry, CDC was able to verify the itinerary and that cargo workers had complied • Importers must screen imported primates for tuberculosis [8] , monitor them for signs of other zoonotic diseases of with disease control measures during multiple previous shipments using the same itinerary. public health significance, and report suspected zoonotic illness in animals or workers to CDC by telephone within
The current CDC requirements appear to have been effective in minimizing human exposure to the animals during transit and 24 h. Shipments must remain in quarantine a minimum of 31 days or, if necessary, longer to rule out or resolve quarantine, in identifying suspect animals during quarantine, in laboratory diagnosis of the infection, in prompting reporting to zoonotic illness. Currently, there are 27 registered importer quarantine facili-CDC, and in containing infection within the registered importer quarantine facility. Following the 1996 outbreak, CDC conties importing Ç8500 animals per year (again, principally macaques). CDC's Division of Quarantine inspects facilities prior ducted a review and reassessment of the CDC requirements; no changes were made. to registration and periodically thereafter and monitors the handling of shipments upon arrival at ports of entry or at the quarantine facilities. Mortality rates during importation and
